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Fifth District banks generated strong profits dur-
ing 1984. Though return on assets (ROA) and re-
turn on equity (ROE) were somewhat lower than
in 1983, they were well above the average for the
previous five years.
The rise of market interest rates in the first half
of 1984 and their fall in the second half led to a net
interest margin performance different in the Fifth
District from that reported for all banks in the
United States. For example, Fifth District banks
were more successful than banks in the rest of the
nation at controlling interest expense as a percent-
age of assets. At the same time, although District
banks posted gains in interest income, banks reported
even stronger results nationwide. The result in the
Fifth District was a net interest margin lower than
any reported in the last six years. In comparison,
all U. S. banks reported a slight increase in net mar-
gin. Still, Fifth District margins remained well
above those in the rest of the nation.
One of the most important factors affecting bank
profitability in 1984 was the increase in provisions
for loan losses, both in the Fifth District and for the
whole United States. In addition, noninterest rev-
enue and expense continued to play significant roles
in offsetting changes in net interest margins. Al-
though Fifth District banks could not match the per-
formance of banks nationwide in increasing nonin-
terest income, they have continued to be successful
at reducing noninterest expense, a goal that has so
far eluded banks at the national level.
Because of Fifth District banks’ higher net interest
margin, lower provision for loan losses, and declin-
ing noninterest expense, they were able to continue
to outperform banks nationwide in both return on
assets and return on equity. In an era of steadily
declining profitability on the national level, banks in
the Fifth District have been able to maintain high
returns.
Interest Revenue
Gross interest ratio, defined as gross interest rev-
enue divided by average assets, rose by 44 basis
points during 1984 to 10.02 for banks in the Fifth
Federal Reserve District (see Table I). This in-
crease, in contrast with the decreases of the two pre-
vious years, reflects the generally higher market rates
experienced over much of 1984 shown in Chart 1.
With average market rates 1% to 1.5% above 1983
rates, 97% of Fifth District banks expanded their
level of interest income compared with 1983 and
70% increased gross interest income as a percent
of average assets. At the national level, the increase
in the gross interest ratio was even greater (see
Appendix).
This increase in gross interest revenue obscures
some differences between the performance of various
size categories of banks, as shown in Chart 2. For
example, medium-sized banks, that is, those with
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INCOME AND EXPENSE AS A PERCENT OF AVERAGE ASSETS
FIFTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1979-1984













8.49 9.46 11.15 10.86 9.58
4.53 5.60 7.29 6.93 5.82
3.96 3.86 3.86 3.93 3.76
0.80 0.90 1.01 1.03 1.16
0.26 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.25
3.24 3.37 3.48 3.53
1.26 1.13 1.14 1.15
0.28 0.20 0.19 0.18







Average assets ($ millions)
(Discrepancies due to rounding errors)
0.94 0.89 0.86 0.87
0.30 0.32 0.33 0.37
0.64 0.57 0.53 0.50
13.51 12.79 12.56 13.12

























Source: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income as submitted by insured banks to their primary regulators.
1 
Average assets are based on fully consolidated volumes outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the year.
2 
Banks were required to report securities gains or losses above the tax line, on their income statements, for the first time
in 1984.
3 
Includes securities and extraordinary gains or losses after taxes, for 1979-1983 data, and extraordinary items and other
adjustments after taxes for 1984 data.
4 
ROA is net income divided by average assets.
5 
ROE is net income divided by average equity. Average equity is based on fully consolidated volumes outstanding at the
beginning and at the end of the year.
had a gross interest ratio increase of 59 basis points
over 1983, while large banks (assets over $750 mil-
lion) saw an increase of 46 basis points. In con-
trast, the smallest Fifth District banks (less than
$100 million) experienced only a 26 basis point in-
crease in gross interest revenue. As in previous
years, this reflects the lower variability of the yields
on loans in smaller banks’ portfolios.
Table II shows that return on total loans for all
Fifth District banks rose by 21 basis points. The
insensitivity of small banks’ loan portfolios to in-
terest rate changes led to considerably slower growth
in loan income than that achieved by the larger
banks. Specifically, 31% of small Fifth District
banks’ loan portfolios consists of mortgage loans,
which typically have fixed rates and long terms and
are therefore comparatively insensitive to fluctuations
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AVERAGE RATES OF RETURN ON SELECTED INTEREST-EARNING ASSETS
FIFTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1979-1984
item 1979 1980 1981
Total loans 11.25 12.50 14.48
Net loans 11.37 12.63 14.64
Total securities 6.43 7.15 8.57
U. S. Government 8.14 9.16 11.22
State and local 5.17 5.56 6.11
Other 2.88 3.25 4.20
Total interest-earning assets 10.09 11.28 13.18













in market rates. In comparison, mortgages averaged
21% of medium banks’ and 13% of large banks’ loan
portfolios. At the same time, large banks held 30%
of their gross loan portfolios in commercial and in-
dustrial (C&I) loans, while medium banks held
26% and small banks held 20%. C&I loans tend to
be interest-sensitive because they often have short
terms or carry variable interest rates.
It is important to look closely at loan growth pat-
11.77
inence of loans relative to other assets in District
banks’ portfolios increased during 1984. Total loan
growth (Table IV) picked up during the last quarter
of 1984, and was spread evenly among most cate-
gories of loans. An exception to the pattern was
agricultural loans, which grew as a percent of total
loans during the first half of the year but declined in
the second half. The result was that, as total loans
grew by slightly more than 20% between the end of
farm loans fell from terns since, as is made clear by Table III, the prom- 1983 and the end of 1984,
Table Ill
ASSET CATEGORIES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS
FIFTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1982-1984
Asset Category
Securities
Loans and leases - Total
Home mortgages
Commercial real estate and development loans





Less: Unearned income on loans
Less: Allowance for loan loss















- 1.68 - 1.38 - 1.22
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QUARTERLY GROWTH RATES IN SELECTED LOAN CATEGORIES
FIFTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1984
Loan Category
Home mortgages












- 11.22 1.36 4.34
3.94 5.24 8.51
8.56 8.46 - 7.79
3.51 5.41 3.72
1.84% to 1.49% of this total. Within the agricul-
tural loan category, loans secured by farmland, which
had remained fairly steady as a percent of total loans
during 1983, fell throughout 1984. Other agricul-
tural loans, which rose during the first half of 1984
and fell during the second half, were lower in each
quarter than in the corresponding period in 1983.
Table II shows that gross returns on securities,
the ratio of securities income to average securities
outstanding, increased from 9.20% in 1983 to 9.68%
in 1984. This increase, however, was due almost
entirely to large banks’ strong performance, since
banks with less than $750 million in total assets
showed little or no improvement in return on their
securities.
Interest Expense
Just as the higher market rates prevalent during
1984 pushed up interest revenue, so did they push up
interest expense. As a percent of average assets, in-
terest expense in Fifth District banks increased 51
basis points from 5.82% in 1983 to 6.33% in 1984
(Table I).
Chart 3 reveals that the effect of higher market
rates on interest expense varied with bank size.
Fifth District banks with more than $100 million in
assets had an average increase of 54 basis points in
their interest expense ratio. For smaller banks,
however, the increase was a more modest 37 basis
points.
The average cost of interest-bearing liabilities in
Fifth District banks rose 60 basis points during 1984,
as reported in Table V. Contributions to this in-
crease varied among the different categories of lia-
bilities. The average cost of such liabilities as large










funds grew much more rapidly than this average
figure. At the end of 1984, these relatively interest-
sensitive liabilities accounted for 24% of total lia-
bilities. Such liabilities as small time deposits (those
in denominations less than $100,000), passbook sav-
ings accounts, individual retirement accounts, Super
NOW accounts, NOW accounts, and money market
deposit accounts (MMDA), all of which are included
in the Other Deposits category in Table V, pro-
duced a much smaller increase in interest expenses
because of the relatively less interest-sensitive nature
of these accounts. Because the deposits included in
the Other Deposits category together make up about
52% of all liabilities in Fifth District banks, they
helped to offset the higher funds costs arising from
the more interest-sensitive liabilities.
Chart 3
INTEREST EXPENSE RATIO*
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AVERAGE COST OF FUNDS FOR SELECTED LIABILITIES
FIFTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1979-1984
Item 1979
Interest bearing deposit accounts 7.15
Large time deposits 9.96
Deposits in foreign offices 10.28
Other deposits 6.16




Fifth District institutions were considerably less
reliant on funds with volatile yields than were banks
nationwide. The relatively interest-sensitive cate-
gories of deposits provided 32% of total liabilities for
all U.S. banks, while the Other Deposits category
amounted to 41%. This helps explain the greater
increase in interest expense for U.S. banks during
1984 compared with banks in the Fifth District.
Demand deposits continued to decline as a per-
centage of total deposits in Fifth District banks. In
1983, these non-interest-bearing checking accounts
represented 25.5% of total domestic deposits. By the
end of 1984 this ratio had fallen to 24.8%, although
it should be noted that this decline was smaller than
that which had taken place from 1982 to 1983. As
the significance of demand deposits in the liability
structures of banks declines, interest expense as a
percent of liabilities or assets increases due to the
rise in the importance of interest-paying liabilities.
Because holders of demand deposits are compensa-
ted implicitly through services provided by their
banks, increases in interest expense should be offset
somewhat by diminutions in noninterest expense.
Since the reduction of the importance of demand de-
posits in the Fifth District was small relative to total
liabilities, it is unlikely that much of this shift from
noninterest expense to interest expense took place
during 1984.
In 1984, Fifth District banks did not experience
the same rapid growth in MMDAs and Super NOW
accounts that occurred in 1983.
l As seen in Chart 4,
MMDA growth was steady throughout the year, ex-
panding by $3.7 billion during the year, from an ini-
tial figure of $14.1 billion to an end-of-year $17.8
1 See F. Ward McCarthy, Jr. (1984), pp. 24-S.

























billion. During this same period, Super NOWs grew
by about $400 million. By the end of 1984, MMDAs
and Super NOWs together made up 14.5% of total
liabilities, while at the end of 1983 they accounted for
13%. On the one hand, if consumers replaced ma-
turing certificates of deposit with MMDAs or Super
NOWS, this liability structure shift may have
lowered Fifth District banks’ total interest cost. On
the other hand, if depositors simply replaced regular
demand deposits and savings deposits with Super
NOWs and MMDAs, banks may have experienced
interest expense increases as the latter accounts grew
in importance.
2
2 Michael C. Keeley and Gary C. Zimmerman (1985)
provide evidence regarding sources of funds for MMDAs.
Chart 4
MMDA AND SUPER NOW GROWTH
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Since interest expense in the Fifth District rose
more quickly relative to average assets than did in-
terest income in 1984, net interest margin declined
from 3.76% to 3.69%. This seven basis point decline
contrasts with the one basis point increase enjoyed
by banks on the national level, and is also difficult to
explain given that the spread between the prime rate
and the 90-day certificate of deposit rate increased
through most of the second half of 1984. However,
the negative net interest margin growth in the Fifth
District conceals the differences between banks in the
three size categories (see Chart 5). Although net
margin decreased eleven basis points for small banks
and eight for large banks, it actually increased by six
basis points for medium-sized banks.
Table VI breaks down various aspects of net in-
terest margin performance for all Fifth District




CHANGES IN NET INTEREST MARGINS IN RELATION TO INTEREST INCOME AND
INTEREST EXPENSE GROWTH RATES AND BALANCE SHEET COMPOSITION
FIFTH DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1984
1 Rote-sensitive liabilities include Super NOW accounts, and money market deposit accounts. In addition, the following ore included
provided they have immediately adjustable interest rates or maturities of one year or less: time deposits. deposits in foreign offices, and
nondeposit interest-bearing liabilities.
2 Rate-sensitive assets include those loons and leases, debt securities, and other interest bearing assets with immediately adjustable
interest rates or with maturities of one year or less.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 17formance for the aggregate of all banks, it appears
that the major differentiating factor between banks
experiencing higher and those experiencing lower net
margins is ability to generate higher interest income
growth. In 1983, the situation was just the opposite,
there being little difference between interest income
performance while ability to reduce interest expense
was crucial to higher margins. Further, in 1983 this
was true for all three size classes.
3 A closer look at
the 1984 numbers shows, however, that there are
more differences between banks than is apparent
from the aggregate figures for all banks. Among
small and medium banks, for example, interest in-
come and interest expense growth were of roughly
equal significance in determining changes in net mar-
gins. For large banks, however, interest income
growth was a far more important determinant of
margins than was interest expense growth.
It is more difficult to draw any strong conclusions
from differences between banks with regard to the
sensitivity of banks’ assets and liabilities to changes
in interest rates. During a period of rising market
rates, holding relatively interest-sensitive assets and
interest-insensitive liabilities should cause margins
to rise. Alternatively stated, if the duration of assets
is less than that of liabilities, assets will be repriced
(at higher rates) more frequently than liabilities.
4
Looking at the aggregate of banks, it appears that
interest-sensitive assets could have been helpful to
those banks having higher net margins. Once the
figures are broken into size classes, however, rela-
tive sensitivities become less informative. More defi-
nite statements could be made on this subject if du-
rations of bank balance sheets were computed, but
that is beyond the scope of this paper.
As noted above, Fifth District banks with between
$100 million and $750 million in total assets at the
end of 1984 produced a six basis point rise in their
net interest margin overall. However, only 37% of
these banks had an increased net margin ratio, the
others experiencing a decline. Medium-sized banks
with improved net margins were, in fact, larger in
terms of total assets than the average for their cate-
3 
McCarthy (1984), pp. 26-7.
4 
Duration may be defined as the weighted average life
of a security or as the sensitivity of the value of a
security to interest rate changes. See George G. Kauf-
man (1984).
gory. As a group, small banks experienced the larg-
est decline in net margins. Only 33% of these banks
were able to improve their net margins compared to
last year.
Noninterest Revenue and Expense
Noninterest income in Fifth District banks was
12% higher during 1984 than in 1983. Asset growth
exceeded noninterest income growth, however, so
noninterest income relative to assets fell by one basis
point (Table I). Service charge income, which
made up about 34% of noninterest income, in-
creased relative to average assets over 1983, as did
leasing income (Table VII). These increases were
offset by declines in Other Noninterest Income,
which includes such items as income from fiduciary
activities, credit card fees, and safe deposit box
rentals. In contrast, noninterest income at the na-
tional level rose significantly in 1984, the major
contributing factor being an increase in Other Non-
interest Income.
Fifth District banks’ flat noninterest income per-
formance was more than offset by an eight basis
point decrease in noninterest expense as a percent of
assets, compared to a ten basis point increase at the
national level. Decreases in both salaries expense
and bank premises costs contributed to this fall.  The
decline in the Fifth District was largely the result
Table VII
NONINTEREST INCOME AS A PERCENT
OF AVERAGE ASSETS























18 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1985of a twelve basis point average decline at large banks,
medium banks experiencing only a three basis point
decline and small banks a two point rise. At the na-
tional level, noninterest expense was pushed up by
both salaries and Other Noninterest Expense, which
includes such costs as legal fees, federal agency as-
sessments, travel expenses, and telephone bills.
Loan loss provisions in Fifth District banks grew
more in 1984 than in any of the past four years. In
fact, relative to average assets, this expense item was
approximately one-third greater in 1984 than in the
previous year. Although this is a significant increase
by Fifth District standards, some perspective may be
gained by comparing the Fifth District results in
Table 1 with the national loan loss provisions shown
in the Appendix. Through 1981, loan loss provi-
sions for the Fifth District banks were similar to
those for all U. S. banks. In 1952, however, loan
loss provisions relative to assets grew 50% over the
previous year for all U.S. banks, while they went up
by only 12% in the Fifth District. Similarly, 1983
national loan loss provisions grew by over 20%,
while in the Fifth District they actually declined.
Thus, although the 32% Fifth District increase in
1954 loan loss provisions represents a greater change
than does the national change of 17%, it should be
borne in mind that Fifth District loan loss provisions
as a percentage of assets remain significantly lower
than those for the aggregate of all banks in the
nation.
Within the Fifth District, most of the increase in
provision for loan loss took place during the fourth
quarter. Banks with more than $750 million in as-
sets were principally responsible for the larger than
normal increase, since these banks as a group in-
creased provisions by ten basis points relative to as-
sets. This increase was to a great extent made neces-
sary by rapid loan growth. At the same time, small
and medium-sized banks increased their provisions
an average of only two basis points.
Loan and lease chargeoffs net of recoveries were
.29% of total loans and leases in Fifth District banks
in 1984, essentially unchanged from the previous
year. In comparison, the 1984 figure for all U.S.
banks was .71%. Past due, nonaccrual, and rene-
gotiated loans and leases amounted to 3.32% of total
loans in Fifth District banks in 1984, while they
averaged 5.07% for all U.S. banks. The most sig-
nificant illustration of Fifth District banks’ continu-
ing pattern of conservative writeclown policies may
be seen in the ratio of current year recoveries to pre-
vious year chargeoffs, which gives an indication of
how aggressively loans are being charged off. This
ratio was 30.5% for Fifth District banks in 1984,
while the same ratio for all U.S. banks was 20.3%.
5
Since this ratio generally increases as banks both en-
force vigorous collection procedures and take less
time to write off doubtful loans, there is no evidence
that Fifth District banks have abandoned their tra-
dition of conservative chargeoff policies.
Profits and Dividends
Profits before taxes relative to average assets fell
by ten basis points from 1983 levels at banks in the
Fifth District. Small and large banks had fifteen
and eleven basis point declines, respectively, while
medium-sized banks realized a nine basis point in-
crease. Had Fifth District banks not increased pro-
visions for loan losses, income before taxes relative
to average assets would have been only two basis
points below its 1983 level. Taxes as a percent of
average assets fell by five basis points at both large
and small banks but increased by four basis points at
medium-sized banks.
Return on assets (ROA), defined as net income
divided by average assets, declined for the aggregate
of Fifth District banks from .98% in 1983 to .93%
in 1954. As Chart 6 shows, however, these figures
mask interesting variations among banks of different
sizes. For example, large banks produced an average
decline in ROA of four basis points to .88%. Al-
though these institutions experienced declining net
margins and noninterest income along with a sig-
nificant increase in provisions for loan losses, they
enjoyed lower noninterest expenses, losses on se-
curities, and taxes. Medium-sized banks, where the
1.05% ROA represented a rise of five basis points
over 1983, had higher net interest margin, greater
noninterest income, and lower noninterest expense
than in 1983. However, some of these gains were
offset by a slight increase in provision for loan losses,
an increase in securities losses, and higher taxes.
Small banks’ ROA fell on average by nine basis
points to 1.12%. This decline was the result of a
5 
For a more detailed breakdown of this ratio on the
national level, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(1985), p. 13.
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RETURN ON ASSETS*
*Net income divided by average assets.
substantial decrease in net interest margin with other
factors cancelling one another. In comparison, for
all U.S. banks, the average ROA fell from .67% in
1983 to .64% in 1984.
Return on average equity (ROE) decreased by
59 basis points to 14.62% for all Fifth District banks.
Despite this decline, ROE in 1984 was still high
compared with the preceding five years. As shown
in Table VIII, aggregate leverage (average assets
divided by average equity) increased thirteen basis
points over last year, but this was not sufficient to
counteract the effect of lower return on assets.
Again, the aggregate numbers conceal some varia-
tion, since medium-sized banks’ ROE increased by
74 basis points (see Chart 7). For all U.S. banks,
the average ROE fell from 11.24% in 1983 to
10.63% in 1984.
Dividends paid out by Fifth District banks to
stockholders declined from .34 cents per dollar of
average assets in 1983 to .31 cents in 1984. Small
banks paid out 31% of net income as dividends,
which was the lowest payout for the three size cate-
gories. Medium banks distributed 39% as dividends,
while large banks paid out 33%. The average divi-
dend to net income ratio for all banks in the United




6 was augmented at Fifth District banks in
1984. According to the data in Table IX, banks in
the Fifth District increased primary capital from
7.24% of adjusted assets in 1983 to 7.28% in 1984,
6 
The measure of capital used here is not precisely the
same as that used by any of the regulatory agencies. In
this article, primary capital includes common stock,
perpetual preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits,
capital reserves, mandatory convertible instruments up
to a certain percentage of primary capital, reserves for
loan and lease losses, and minority interest in consoli-
dated subsidiaries. Secondary capital (total capital less
primary capital) includes limited life preferred stock,
subordinated notes and debentures, and those mandatory
convertible instruments not eligible for primary capital.
In addition, the measure used here subtracts intangible
assets from average assets plus loan loss reserves (to
yield adjusted assets), and from capital. For a detailed
explanation of capital adequacy standards, see R. Alton
Gilbert et al. (1985).
Chart 7
RETURN ON EQUITY*
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CAPITAL ADEQUACY



































and total capital from 7.46% to 7.49%. Primary and
total capital ratios were higher for Fifth District
banks than for all U.S. hanks both in 1983 and 1984,
although the capitalization ratios increased by a
somewhat greater percentage nationally than was the
case in the Fifth District.
The only size category of banks that experienced
declining ratios was that of small banks, and this was
true nationally as well as for the District. This
should not be a cause for concern, however, since
capitalization of small banks as a group was well
above the threshold of regulatory concern
7 in both
years. Large Fifth District banks increased their
primary ratio by 29 basis points while the average
for all large banks in the country grew by 66 points.
Even with the greater increase at all large U. S.
banks, however, large Fifth District commercial
banks remained, on average, more extensively capi-
talized at the end of 1984 than did their peers
throughout the country. Finally, medium-sized banks
in the Fifth District increased their capital ratios at
about the same rate as  did large District banks, while
7 The FDIC and Comptroller have established 6 percent
as the minimum total capital ratio, while the Fed gener-
ally considers under 6 percent to be undercapitalized, 6
percent to 7 percent acceptably capitalized, and over 7
percent to be adequately capitalized. For a description
of the Federal Reserve standards, see 50 Fed. Reg. 16057.
all U. S. banks in the middle category reported minor
increases. The inference to be drawn from all this
is that Fifth District banks are as a group well capi-
talized by national standards, although it should be
borne in mind that such averages as are presented
here conceal a great deal of variation among indi-
vidual banks, especially in the smallest size category.
It is of interest to examine more closely how
growth in capitalization was brought about. Increas-
ing equity capital is one means of augmenting capital
ratios, and in 1984 Fifth District banks increased
equity capital by 13.4%. Retained earnings, the
difference between net income and cash dividends,
provided 77% of this increase. Table VIII shows,
however, that leverage increased in the Fifth Dis-
trict in 1984, which in turn implies that asset
growth continued to outpace equity growth. Thus,
higher capital to assets ratios were not attributable
to increases in equity capital. Rather, higher allow-
ance for loan losses was apparently the most signifi-
cant factor contributing to the rise for District banks.
For all U. S. banks, the most important factors were
increases in subordinated notes and mandatory con-
vertible debt.
Concluding Comments
Fifth District banks’ 1984 performance, relative to
the average for all U. S. banks, was outstanding.
Fifth District banks had a much higher ROA and
ROE than the national average. Their loan charge-
offs and nonperforming loans relative to total loans
were a fraction of the national average. Finally, Fifth
District banks had capital ratios which demonstrated
stronger capital positions than their peers nationwide.
These strong capital ratios not only show the results
of the District’s traditionally conservative approach
to banking, but also place District banks in a good
position for continued growth in 1985.
Still, District banks should note that their higher
performance levels conceal some significant differ-
ences between them and other banks in the nation.
First, interest revenue in the Fifth District was below
the national level. Second, noninterest income per-
formance was far better at the national level than in
the District. Finally, although net interest margins
in the Fifth District remained higher than those for
the nation, they have been declining steadily in the
District while staying fairly steady nationwide. In
the coming years, it will be important for banks in
the Fifth District to pay attention to these areas,
while continuing to make the  most  of their consider-
able strengths.
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INCOME AND EXPENSE AS A PERCENT OF AVERAGE ASSETS
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Average assets ($ billions)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
8.62 9.87 11.81 11.19 9.50
5.50 6.78 8.75 8.02 6.36
3.12 3.09 3.07 3.17 3.15
0.78 0.89 0.99 1.05 1.12
0.24 0.25 0.26 0.39 0.47
2.54 2.63 2.76 2.91 2.95
1.12 1.10 1.04 0.91 0.84
0.28 0.28 0.24 0.17 0.18
- 0.04 - 0.03 - 0.04 - 0.03 0.00
0.80 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.67
0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.33
0.52 0.50 0.46 0.40 0.34
13.90 13.70 13.20 12.20 11.24

















(Discrepancies due to rounding errors)
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1981, 1984 (1979-83 data), Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income as submitted
by insured banks to their primary regulators (1984 data).
1 
See Table I, footnote 1.
2 
See Table I, footnote 2.
3 
See Table I, footnote 3.
4 
See Table I, footnote 4.
5 
See Table I, footnote 5.
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